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A Comparison of the Cultures and Performance of a
Modern Agency and a Nineteenth-Century Agency
Richard J. Pierce, Jr.∗
introduction
In his invitation to participate in this symposium to honor Jerry L. Mashaw,
Professor Parrillo suggested themes that would be appropriate to address as
tributes to the extraordinary contributions that Professor Mashaw has made
to administrative law. I have chosen a topic that fits under Professor Parrillo’s
heading of “the relationship of legal culture (including judicial review) to
the behavior and performance of administrative agencies.” I will compare the
cultures and performance of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion (NHTSA) with the cultures and performance of the Board of Supervising
Inspectors of 1852 (Board).
In a sense, everything I have ever done in the field of administrative law is
attributable to Professor Mashaw. In 1969, he was my professor in a six-credit
hour course called “Legislative and Administrative Law.” For four decades, I
taught administrative law using his casebook.1 I have learned most of what I
know about the American public law system by reading the many books and
articles he has written. This essay was inspired by, and borrows heavily from,
the books and articles Professor Mashaw has written about the culture and
performance of NHTSA and the Board.2
∗ I am indebted to Francesca Bignami, Marija Dordeska, Rob Glicksman, Emily Hammond,
Kristin Hickman, Alexandra Klasse, Jerry L. Mashaw, Tom McGarity, Alan Morrison, Nicholas
Parrillo, Joshua Schwartz, Sidney Shapiro, Paul Verkuil, Wendy Wagner, the participants in a
works in progress luncheon atGeorgeWashingtonUniversity School of Law and the participants
in a symposium at Yale Law providing helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.
1 Jerry L. Mashaw, Richard A. Merrill, Peter M. Shane, Elizabeth Magill, Mariano-
Florentino Cue´llar & Nicholas R. Parrillo, Administrative Law: The American
Public Law System (7th ed. 2014).
2 Jerry L. Mashaw, Administration and “The Democracy”: Administrative Law from Jackson to
Lincoln, 1829–1861, 117 Yale. L. J. 1568, 1628–93 (2008); Jerry L. Mashaw & David L.
Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety (1990) [hereinafter cited as Mashaw & Harfst,
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In section I, I describe generally the cultures and performance of NHTSA
and the Board. In section II, I compare the performances of the two agencies
with reference to the problem of ossification of rules and, more broadly, of
serious problems in all aspects of an agency’s performance of its missions. In
section III, I relate those problems to the large reductions in agency resources
that seem increasingly inevitable as a function of our budgeting process. In
section IV, I describe some of the ways in which the excessive proceduraliza-
tion of the agency decision-making process has contributed to systemic bias in
the decision-making process. In section V, I compare the rulemaking process
in the US with the rulemaking process in the European Union to show that
the agency culture that produced good results in the US in the nineteenth
century can improve the performance of agencies in the twenty-first century.
In section VI, I describe potential legal paths back to the nineteenth century
legal culture in the US.
i the cultures and performance of nhtsa and the board
Congress created NHTSA in 19663 and the Board in 18524 to perform anal-
ogous missions using identical regulatory tools. The largest single source of
avoidable accidents in 1966 was the “second collision,” the collision between
some part of the human body and some part of the inside of a car when a
car is in an accident. Second collisions caused 12,000 avoidable deaths and
100,000 avoidable injuries every year.5 The largest single source of avoidable
accidents in 1852 was steamboat explosions. Thus, for instance, there were 233
steamboat explosions in 1848; a single explosion in St. Louis in 1849 destroyed
23 steamboats; and a single steamboat explosion in 1864 killed 1647 people.6
Congress provided each agency with one primary tool to perform its
mission – rulemaking. The performance of the agencies varied dramatically,
however. Within two years of its creation, the Board had issued scores of rules
that had the effect of reducing loss of life attributable to steamboat explo-
sions by 75 percent and property damage caused by steamboat explosions by
Auto Safety]; Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case
of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 Yale J. Reg. 257 (1987) [hereinafter Mashaw & Harfst, Regulation
and Legal Culture].
3 National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89–563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966)
(codified at 15 USC §§ 1381–1431).
4 Act of Aug. 30, 1852, ch. 106, 10 Stat. 61.
5 The Supreme Court accepted the agency’s estimates for purposes of judicial review. Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co, 463 US 29, 35 (1983).
6 American Experience, People and Events: Steamboat Disasters (PBS Home 2015).
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90 percent.7 The rules were wide-ranging. They addressed issues like licensing
of steamboat officers, certification and inspection of boilers, specifications for
the permissible diameter and operating pressure of boilers, navigation rules
for steamboats, and mandatory signs in staterooms that informed passengers
of the location of life preservers.8 By contrast, it took NHTSA twenty-three
years to issue the rule that had by far the greatest beneficial effect on highway
safety – the passive restraint (airbag) rule.9 The agency’s frustration as a result
of that lengthy and resource-intensive effort induced it to abandon the tool
of rulemaking almost entirely and to devote most of its scarce resources to
an alternative – recalls of defective automobiles–that has had little beneficial
effect.10 In Professor Mashaw’s words, NHTSA’s abandonment of rulemaking
was “the virtual abandonment of its safety mission.”11
It is impossible to identify and to account for the many changes in the
political environment that may explain part of the difference between the
performance of the Board and NHTSA, but it seems likely that the dominant
source of the differing performances of the Board and NHTSA was differences
in legal culture. The Board was subject to only one mandatory procedure. It
was required to provide written reasons for each decision it made.12 None of its
actions were subject to judicial review.13 NHTSA was required to comply with
the notice and comment procedure described in section 553 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA).14 More importantly, NHTSA rules are subject to
pre-enforcement judicial review.
One difference in results illustrates well the effects of pre-enforcement judi-
cial review. The Board was required to provide “written reasons” for every rule
it issued, while NHTSA was required to provide a “concise general statement
of basis and purpose” for every rule it issued. The two procedural require-
ments sound the same, but they varied dramatically because of the effects of
pre-enforcement judicial review. A typical Board statement of reasons was a
few paragraphs long. It was written to explain the basis for the Board’s action
to its superiors in the White House, Congress, and the public at large.15 A
typical NHTSA statement of basis and purpose is hundreds of pages long.
7 Mashaw, supra note 2, at 1647. 8 Id. at 1644–46.
9 Mashaw & Harfst, Auto Safety, supra note 2, at 211. The passive restraint rule saved more
lives than all of the other rules NHTSA issued combined. Id. at 85.
10 Jerry L. Mashaw and David Harfst, The Transformation of Auto Safety Regulation: Bureau-
cratic Adaptation to Legal Culture (Dec. 14, 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2703370.; Mashaw & Harfst, Auto Safety, supra note 2,
at 11, 69, 199–201; Mashaw & Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture, supra note 2, at
263–64.
11 Auto Safety, supra note 2, at 11. 12 Mashaw, supra note 2, at 1641–42.
13 Id. at 1669–84. 14 5 USC § 553. 15 Mashaw, supra note 2, at 1656–57.
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Thus, for instance, the statement of basis and purpose that accompanied the
passive restraint rule was 750 pages long.16 It was written to explain the basis
of the rule to NHTSA’s superiors in the judiciary. It is unimaginable that
a NHTSA statement of the basis and purpose of a rule would ever be read
by NHTSA’s political superiors or by any member of the public at large. As
shaped by courts, the statements of basis and purpose required by the APA
have “metastasize[d] into the book-length treatises that one now often finds in
the Federal Register.”17
Until 1875, the Supreme Court repeatedly and consistently held that agency
actions were not subject to judicial review if they required the exercise of any
discretion.18 The only executive actions that were subject to judicial review
were mandatory ministerial acts that required no exercise of discretion.19 As
a result, federal courts could not, and did not, review any rule issued by the
Board.
As ProfessorMerrill has described in detail,20 the SupremeCourt’s approach
to judicial review of agency actions changed gradually between 1875 and 1946.
The Supreme Court began to authorize lower courts to review agency actions
using an appellate review model. In 1946, Congress codified this approach
by enacting the APA.21 That statute instructed courts to review final agency
actions22 except “so far as . . . agency action is by law committed to agency
discretion.”23
The APA also required agencies to use a particular procedure to issue a rule
that has the force of law. As written, the three-step process for issuing rules
described in APA section 553 is simple, sensible, and efficient. An agency must
issue a notice of proposed rulemaking, solicit comments from the public in
response to the notice, and issue a final rule that incorporates a concise general
statement of the basis and purpose of the rule. The APA describes the three
steps in the following language:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register . . . . The notice shall include–
16 Mashaw & Harfst, Auto Safety, supra note 2, at 210–11.
17 Mashaw, supra note 2, at 1656.
18 E.g., Gaines v. Thompson, 74 US (7 Wall) 347, 352–53 (1868); Reeside v. Walker, 52 US (11
How.) 272 (1850);Decatur v. Paulding, 39US (14Pet.) 497, 515–16 (1840). See generallyNicholas
Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1285, 1294–1302 (2014).
19 Marbury v. Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 170 (1803).
20 Thomas Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Emergence of the Appellate Review
Model, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 939, 953–65 (2011).
21 For the history of the enactment of the APA, see George Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The
Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1557 (1996).
22 5 USC § 704. 23 5 USC § 701(b).
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(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making
proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of
the subjects and issues involved . . .
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission
of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral
presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency
shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their
basis and purpose.
Until 1967, agencies complied with APA section 553 as that provision was
written. In a typical rulemaking, the agency issued a relatively brief notice that
complied with 553(b), received and considered comments that were modest
in length, and then issued a final rule that incorporated a “concise general
statement of basis and purpose” that was only a few pages long.24 The agency
practice of compliancewith APA section 553 as it is written ended as a result of a
series of court opinions thatwere issued between 1967 and 1973. Those opinions
changed themeaning of section 553 inways that render it unrecognizablewhen
compared with the language of section 553.
The Supreme Court’s 1967 opinion in Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner25 opened the door to a series of lower court opinions that “inter-
preted” section 553 to mean something dramatically different from the sim-
ple efficient decision-making process described in the APA. In Abbott, the
Court announced a new test for determining whether a rule is ripe for pre-
enforcement review. TheCourt announced and applied for the first time a pre-
sumption of reviewability so strong that it trumped the language of statutes.26
Like most regulatory statutes, the statute at issue in Abbott explicitly provided
a means through which a party could seek review of a rule – by challenging
its validity in an enforcement proceeding initiated by the agency against the
party. The statute did not authorize a court to engage in pre-enforcement
review of a rule. The Court applied the new presumption of reviewability to
reverse the normal process for determining whether Congress has authorized
a court to act. Instead of asking whether Congress authorized pre-enforcement
review, the Court asked whether there was “clear and convincing evidence”
that Congress intended to preclude pre-enforcement review.27 The Court
24 Jack Beerman & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 Geo. W. L. Rev. 856 (2007).
25 387 US 136 (1967). 26 Id. at 140. See generally Bagley, supra note 18, at 1304–09.
27 387 US at 141.
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concluded that the presence of a statutory provision that authorized review of
a rule in an enforcement proceeding and the absence of a statutory provision
that authorized pre-enforcement review of a rule were not enough to satisfy
the “clear and convincing evidence” standard that the Court announced to
accompany its newly announced presumption in favor of pre-enforcement
review of rules. Around the same time the Court authorized pre-enforcement
review of rules, Congress began to enact regulatory statutes that purported
to authorize pre-enforcement review of rules. The National Highway Traffic
Safety Act was one of the first statutes that included such a provision.28
The Abbott opinion also stretched the Article III requirement of a “Case
or Controversy” as a prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction to, or perhaps
beyond, its breaking point. As ProfessorMashaw has noted, prior to Abbott, the
Case or Controversy Clause was understood to bar judicial review of abstract
issues such as the abstract validity of a rule.29 The validity of a rule could be
challenged in an enforcement proceeding in which the government relied on
the rule, but only as “a by-product of the need to determine individual rights”
“on the basis of particular facts.”30
Before Abbott, most rules were subject to review only in an enforcement
proceeding. After Abbott, a rule was subject to pre-enforcement review if, like
most rules, it presents a legal issue that is “fit for judicial resolution” and
“requires an immediate change in the plaintiffs’ conduct of their affairs with
serious penalties attached to noncompliance . . . .”31
The stark differences between the review of a rule in an enforcement pro-
ceeding and the pre-enforcement review of a rule became apparent within a
few years of the Court issuing its opinion in Abbott. When a rule was reviewed
in the context of an enforcement proceeding, it was usually reviewed by a dis-
trict court that used the record of the enforcement proceeding as the basis for
review. Since agencies usually exercise their prosecutorial discretion to bring
an action to enforce a rule only when the target of the enforcement action
has engaged in conduct that is particularly egregious and obviously harmful,
the record in the enforcement proceeding typically included evidence that
illustrated the need for the rule in a specific context in which violation of
the rule caused serious damage. As a result, an agency was likely to prevail in
an action in which the target of an enforcement action sought review of the
rule. Rules were rarely challenged because a regulated firm knew that it was
unlikely to prevail when it attempted to challenge the validity of the rule in an
enforcement proceeding. The firm also knew that it was vulnerable to serious
28 Mashaw & Harfst, Auto Safety, supra note 2, at 157.
29 Id. at 156–58. 30 Id. at 157. 31 387 US at 153.
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direct and indirect adverse consequences if it violated the rule, challenged the
validity of the rule in an enforcement proceeding, and lost.
By contrast, any firm that dislikes a rule has an incentive to seek pre-
enforcement review of the rule knowing that it will suffer no adverse effects
if it loses. Within a few years of the Court’s decision in Abbott, it became
apparent that a regulated firm also has a much better chance of prevailing in
a proceeding in which it seeks pre-enforcement review of a rule than when it
challenges the validity of the same rule in a proceeding to enforce the rule. In
most cases, pre-enforcement review takes place in a circuit court rather than
a district court. The circuit court has an understandable desire to have access
to some kind of record that it can use as the basis for review. It does not have
access to the record of an enforcement proceeding for that purpose, so it uses
a “record” that consists of the notice, the comments filed in response to the
notice, and the “concise general statement” of the rule’s basis and purpose
that the agency is required to incorporate in the final rule.
In Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd,32 one of the first pre-
enforcement review cases decided after the Supreme Court issued its opinion
in Abbott, the D.C. Circuit stated that it needed access to a record sufficient
to allow it to engage in pre-enforcement review of a rule. The court then
described the conflict between the record that is created when an agency
complies with APA section 553 and the kind of record the court thought that it
needed to engage in pre-enforcement review of a rule. The court resolved that
conflict by instructing agencies to take the actions needed to develop the kind
of record the court considered necessary to allow it to engage in review rather
than to comply with the requirements Congress described in APA section 553.
In the court’s words:
[It] is appropriate for us to remind the Administrator of the ever present pos-
sibility of judicial review, and to caution against an overly literal reading of
the statutory terms ‘concise’ and ‘general.’ These adjectives must be accom-
modated to the realities of judicial scrutiny, which do not contemplate that
the court itself will, by a laborious examination of the record, formulate in
the first instance the significant issues faced by the agency and articulate the
rationale of their resolution. We do not expect the agency to discuss every
item of fact or opinion included in the submissions made to it in informal
rule making. We do expect that, if the judicial review which Congress has
thought it important to provide is to be meaningful, the ‘concise general
statement of ∗ ∗ ∗ basis and purpose’ mandated by Section 4 will enable us to
see what major issues of policy were ventilated by the informal proceedings
and why the agency reacted to them as it did.33
32 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 33 Id. at 338.
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The court went on to hold that the three-page “concise general statement of
basis and purpose” that the agency had incorporated in the rule was sufficient
to allow the court to uphold the rule because the petitioner did not file
detailed and well-supported comments that criticized the rule proposed in the
notice.34
The members of the D.C. Bar immediately internalized and acted on the
message the D.C. Circuit sent in Auto Parts. Lawyers for regulated firms that
disliked a rule proposed by an agency began to submit lengthy and detailed
comments that criticized the rule, often accompanied by consultants’ reports
that included findings and conclusions that undermined the basis for the rule.
Thus, for instance, when the National Highway Safety Administration pro-
posed another rule shortly after its “victory” in Auto Parts, a trade association
that disliked the proposed rule submitted lengthy comments that criticized
in detail every aspect of the agency proposal.35 The comments were accom-
panied by the reports of studies conducted by consulting firms retained by
the association that found that the proposed rule was unnecessary and that its
implementation would be costly and dangerous. The association prevailed in
the pre-enforcement review proceeding it initiated based on theD.C. Circuit’s
conclusion that the final rule was arbitrary and capricious because the agency
had not responded adequately to the comments filed by the association that
were critical of the proposed rule.36
That pair of D.C. Circuit opinions created an entirely new legal environ-
ment. Every circuit has followed the lead of theD.C.Circuit in holding that an
agency rule is arbitrary and capricious unless the agency responds adequately
to all well-supported comments that are critical of the rule proposed by the
agency, and the Supreme Court’s 1983 opinion in Motor Vehicle Manufactur-
ers’ Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.37 has been widely
interpreted to approve of the D.C. Circuit approach. The Supreme Court also
added a seemingly open-ended duty to consider alternatives to any action an
agency proposes to take in a rulemaking.
Not surprisingly, those judicial opinions have created incentives for parties
that dislike proposed rules to bury an agency with comments that criticize the
proposed rule and suggest alternatives to the proposed rule.38 Comments on
34 Id. at 338–41.
35 National Tire Dealers and Retreaders Ass’n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31, 36–40 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
36 Id. at 40–41.
37 463 US 29 (1983). See generally 1 Richard Pierce, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.4
(5th ed. 2010).
38 ProfessorWagner discusses this phenomenon at length inWendyWagner, Administrative Law,
Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 Duke L. J. 1321, 1353–65 (2010).
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economically significant proposed rules often total tens of thousands of pages,
including consultant studies that purport to undermine the bases for the pro-
posed rule. Agencies regularly require years to draft the several-hundred-page
“concise general statement of basis and purpose” that must be incorporated
in an economically significant rule, and courts reject 30 percent of the rules
as arbitrary and capricious because the agency did not adequately respond
to one or more of the voluminous critical comments.39 In short, the courts
converted the statutory requirement for a “concise general statement of basis
and purpose” into a judicial requirement for a detailed and encyclopedic doc-
ument that invariably spans hundreds of pages in the context of economically
significant rules.
Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Abbott, circuit courts
began a similar process of rewriting the APA notice requirement. APA section
553 requires an agency to issue a “general notice” that consists of:
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making
proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues involved . . . 40
As was true of the requirement for a “concise general statement of basis and
purpose,” before theCourt decidedAbbott, agencies compliedwith themodest
notice requirement in APA section 553 by publishing notices that were just
a few pages long but that complied fully with the language of the APA. That
changed as courts redefined the requirements of the APA.
The post-Abbott judicial opinion that began the process of redefinition of
the notice requirement Congress created in the APA was issued by the Third
Circuit in 1972.41 The court held a notice inadequate because it did not inform
the public of all of the possible ways in which the agency might change the
rules it proposed to amend. All circuits soon adopted that demanding method
of determining the adequacy of a notice. All circuits now hold that a notice
is inadequate if the final rule is not a “logical outgrowth” of the notice.42 The
practical effect of the “logical outgrowth” test is to require agencies to attempt
to identify and describe in a notice every conceivable version of the final rule
the agency might adopt years later.43
TheD.C. Circuit joined in the process of redefining the notice requirement
a year later. In 1973, the D.C. Circuit rejected an agency rule because the rule
39 Richard Pierce, What Do the Studies of Judicial Review of Agency Actions Mean?, 63 Admin.
L. Rev. 77 (2011).
40 5 USC § 553(b). 41 Wagner Electric Corp v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972).
42 Pierce, supra note 37, at §7.3. 43 Beerman & Lawson, supra note 24, at 895–99.
A Comparison of Agency Cultures and Performance 331
was based in part on a source of data that the agency had not identified in
its notice.44 All circuits quickly embraced that dramatic judicial expansion
of the “general notice” requirement that Congress imposed in the APA.45 All
circuits now hold that “an agency commits serious procedural error when
it fails to reveal portions of the technical basis for a proposed rule in time
to allow for meaningful commentary”46 and that the notice “must provide
sufficient information to permit adversarial critique.”47 The practical effect of
this judicially imposed duty is to require an agency to anticipate at the time
it issues a notice all of the sources of data and analysis that it may want to
rely on years later when it issues a final rule. The agency also must issue a
supplemental notice and provide a new opportunity to comment if it decides
to rely on a source of data or analysis that did not become available until
after it issued its initial notice.48 That is a routine occurrence, since a major
rulemaking typically requires years to complete.
Professors Wagner, Barnes, and Peters have described the results of the
dramatic judicial expansions of the modest requirement to issue a “general
notice” that Congress imposed in APA section 553. The pre-notice part of the
rulemaking process now takes more than twice as long as the post-notice part
of the process because “the courts have made it painfully clear that if a rule is
to survive judicial review, it must be essentially in final form at the proposed
rule stage.”49 When the judicial expansions of the congressional requirement
of a “concise general statement of basis and purpose” are added to the judicial
expansions of the congressional requirement of a “general notice” of proposed
rulemaking, the judicial version of APA section 553 bears no relationship to
the requirements imposed by the statute.
Professor Mashaw has documented in detail the effects of judicial review
on NHTSA. He concluded that reviewing courts have been “disabling,”50
“debilitating,”51 “obstructionist,”52 and “the legal embodiment of inertia.”53
He provided a one paragraph summary of the effects of the review process:
The primary demands of the legal culture of regulation – that regulatory
policy be subject to the rule of law through judicial review and procedurally
open to affected interests – have been much in evidence throughout the
44 Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
45 Pierce, supra note 37, at §7.3.
46 Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.3d 525, 530–31 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
47 Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
48 Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
49 Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical
Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emissions Standards, 63 Admin. L. Rev. 99, 110, 144 (2011).
50 Mashaw & Harfst, Auto Safety, supra note 2, at 315.
51 Id. at 305. 52 Id. at 249. 53 Id. at 249.
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history of federal motor vehicle safety regulation. Indeed, as we have seen,
these demands have been mutually reinforcing. Judicial review has been
“proceduralized” . . . And by focusing on “process rationality,” the judiciary
has leveraged both the strategic and the legal positions of regulatory partic-
ipants. Not only must the agency listen with care, but participants may use
their access to provide multiple grounds for later reversal of the agency’s
choices.54
Professor Mashaw also used a colorful analogy to capture the role of the
courts: “It seemed that NASA had made it to the moon and back because its
engineering judgments were not subject to judicial review.”55
The presence or absence of judicial reviewhadmajor effects on the structure
and internal operation of the Board and NHTSA. The Board was staffed by
engineers with experience in boiler design and operation. It used informal,
unregulated methods of obtaining the information needed to issue a rule –
presumably some combination of the expertise of the Board members and
discussions with other experts known to the Board members. When the Board
needed legal assistance, it asked the Attorney General for a legal opinion56 or
reported to a US Attorney someone who repeatedly violated the law and defied
the Board.57
When it began operating in 1966, NHTSA also was dominated by
engineers.58 A decade later, however, the agency was dominated by lawyers.59
In Professor Mashaw’s words, a “detailed look inside NHTSA as events
unfolded during the crucial decade of the 1970s reveals the signal impor-
tance of the law in empowering bureaucratic actors and establishing the
agency’s internal standards of success or failure.”60 And it was the transla-
tion of law by courts through the review process that produced near paralysis
within NHTSA. As Professor Mashaw explained, “[i]t will be only natural for
[agency] staff to become more risk averse than the judiciary that poses the
outside threat. . . . Even a modest judicial demand for an adequate reasoning
process can translate into bureaucratic paralysis . . . .”61
ii rulemaking ossification and other costs of modern
agency legal culture
Many studies of the modern administrative process have described the effects
of legal culture under the general heading of rulemaking ossification.62
54 Id. at 225. 55 Id. at 122. 56 Mashaw, supra note 2, at 1644. 57 Id. at 1650.
58 Mashaw & Harfst, Auto Safety, supra note 2, at 172. 59 Id. at 174.
60 Id. at 175. 61 Id. at 298.
62 Richard Pierce,RulemakingOssification Is Real, 80Geo. W.L. Rev. 1493 (2012). See also Scott
Atherley, Federal Agency Compliance with Congressional Regulatory Deadlines, R Street
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Ossification refers to the tendency of agencies to refrain from attempting to
issue needed rules, delay in the process of issuing rules, and refusal to amend
or to rescind rules that have become obsolete because of the magnitude of the
resources agencies must devote to the rulemaking process and the amount of
time it takes to issue, amend, or rescind an economically significant rule in
the modern legal culture.63
The costs of ossification are illustrated well by the delay in NHTSA’s
issuance of a passive restraint rule that could satisfy the courts. The direct costs
of the modern legal culture in the context of the passive restraint rule include
240,000 lost lives and 2,000,000 injuries.64 If NHTSA had been operating in
the nineteenth-century legal culture, it would have been able to replicate the
performance of the Board. It would have issued the passive restraint rule and
many other life-saving rules within two years of its creation.65
The indirect costs of NHTSA’s lengthy and expensive experience with
modern legal culture may be even higher, but they are hard to estimate.
NHTSA largely abandoned its use of rulemaking after its experience with the
passive restraint rule.66 We will never know how many more lives NHTSA
would have been able to save if it had been able to replicate the performance
of the Board and to issue scores of additional safety rules during its first few
years of existence.
The costs of ossification are not unique to the auto safety context. Thus,
for instance, the social security disability decision-making process has long
been handicapped by ossification of the rulemaking process. The “grid rule”
illustrates the problem. Before 1978, the Social Security Administration (SSA)
relied on a large number of “vocational experts” to testify in disability hearings
with respect to the jobs available to someone with the characteristics of the
applicant.67 In 1978, SSA acted on a suggestion from a team of scholars led
by Professor Mashaw68 and issued the “grid rule.”69 That rule had the effect
of replacing the testimony of a vocational expert in most cases. Administrative
law judges (ALJs) were instructed to enter the age, education, experience,
and health state of an applicant in a grid that would then yield one of two
Policy Study No. 39 (Aug. 4, 2015) (agencies failed to comply with 1400 statutory deadlines
for issuing rules between 1995 and 2014). But see Jason Yackee & Susan Yackee, Testing the
Ossification Thesis, 80 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1414 (2012).
63 Richard Pierce, Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59 (1995).
64 See supra text accompanying note 5. 65 See supra text accompanying notes 7–8.
66 See supra text accompanying note 10. 67 Heckler v. Campbell, 461 US 458, 461 (1983).
68 Jerry L.Mashaw,Charles J.Goetz,Warren F. Schwartz, Paul R.Verkuil &Milton
M. Carrow, Social Security Hearings and Appeals 79–87 (1978).
69 43 Fed. Reg. 55,349 (1978), codified at 20 CFR § 404.1566.
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results – either a description of one or more jobs that could be performed
by the applicant or a finding that there were no jobs available for such an
applicant.
For a decade or so, the grid rule produced results far superior to the prior
reliance on the testimony of vocational experts. The grid rule saved decision-
making time, enhanced efficiency, reduced the resources needed to make
disability decisions, and improved both the accuracy and the consistency of the
decision-making process. Over time, however, the grid rule lost value because
it was not regularly amended to reflect the myriad changes in the dynamic
US economy. In 2014 the Washington Post described the problem with an
illustration of the obsolescence of the grid rule. The list of jobs SSA uses to
apply the grid rule “lists a ‘web worker’ as someone who repairs fishing nets (a
heavy duty job . . . fit only for the strong and able).”70 Officially, SSA has never
heard of information technology or the Internet. The problem does not lie in
agency incompetence but in rulemaking ossification. SSA is not willing and
able to divert from its other important tasks the enormous resources required
to amend the grid rule in a timely manner when rulemaking is subject to
modern legal culture.
The grid rule is far from unique in this respect. SSA has long had a “treating
physician” rule that makes it difficult for an ALJ to make any finding that is
inconsistent with an opinion expressed by any physician who has treated the
applicant even when the opinion is poorly supported and is contradicted by the
well-supported opinions provided by physicians who consult for SSA.71 The
treating physician rule has been the subject of harsh criticism for decades.
The critics include the six scholars who studied SSA decision-making under
the leadership of Professor Mashaw in 1978,72 nine Supreme Court Justices in
2003,73 and the Administrative Conference of the United States in 2013.74 Yet
SSA has not even begun the process of deciding whether to rescind or amend
the treating physician rule after decades of criticism of the rule.
The indirect costs of rulemaking ossification appear in many other forms.
Every proceeding to issue, amend, or rescind a major rule requires an agency
to commit significant resources to the proceeding for five to ten years. That, in
turn, reduces the resources agencies have available to perform other functions.
That reduction is coupledwith reductions in available resources attributable to
70 David A. Fahrenthold, It’s Just Maddening. There Is Nothing You Can Do, Washington
Post, October 18, 2014, at 1.
71 20 CFR § 404.1527(d)(2). 72 Mashaw et al., supra note 68, at 54–60.
73 Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 US 822 (2003).
74 Administrative Conference of the United States, Disability Benefits Program:
Assessing the Efficacy of the Treating Physician Rule (2013).
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the decreases in appropriations to agencies required by increasingly stringent
fiscal policy limits on discretionary spending.75
The results are apparent across the federal government. Thus, for instance,
the average time to resolve an immigration case is now 600 days, and the
Justice Department expects to begin hearings in nonpriority cases in four
years;76 customer service provided by the Internal Revenue Service is at its
lowest level in history, with over half of taxpayers unable to reach anyone
on the IRS helpline and the agency unable to answer millions of written
questions from taxpayers;77 and the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (DVA)
scandalous inability to provide timely service to veterans has resulted in the
deaths of many veterans before DVA got around to processing their requests
for medical assistance or benefits.78 Even the White House office that reviews
major agency rules is so understaffed that it cannot perform its responsibilities
in a timely manner.79
iii the costs of excessive proceduralization
of rulemaking will increase
Each of the costs of excessive proceduralization of rulemaking illustrated in
the prior section is attributable to the large and growing gap between the
missions Congress assigns agencies and the resources agencies have available
to perform those missions, given the procedures courts require agencies to
use to perform those missions. This gap will grow significantly over the next
decade and beyond. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects an
increase in spending on Social Security and Medicare from 12.5 percent to
14.2 percent of GDP and an increase in interest on the national debt of
75 See infra text accompanying notes 79–80.
76 Devlin Barrett, Save the Date: Immigrants Face Judge in 2019, Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 2015, at
A6.
77 National Taxpayer Advocate, Annual Report to Congress ix (2014).
78 The VA scandal has produced many reports and lots of congressional testimony from the DVA
Inspector General (IG). See Department of Veterans Affairs, Office of Inspector
General, March 2015 Highlights. There is reason to believe the situation is actually worse
than the IG described in his reports and testimony. SeeDonovan Slack,VADoesn’t Release 140
Vet Health Care Probe Findings, USA Today, March 8, 2015; Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, Lead
Investigator of Wait Times at Veterans Affairs Still Gets Criticism of Report, Washington Post,
Nov. 1, 2014.
79 See statement of John Graham, former Director of the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, quoted in Energy & Environment Daily (Mar. 20, 2015); Alex Bolton, Rachel
Potter & Sharece Thrower, Presidential Oversight and Regulatory Delay: How
Politics and Organizational Capacity Influence OIRA Rule Review (2014); Curtis
Copeland, Length of Rule Reviews by the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States (2013).
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1.2 percent to 3.0 percent between 2015 and 2024.80 Depending on whether
CBO assumes adoption of the budget preferred by Congressional Republicans
or the budget proposed by President Obama, CBO projects a decrease in
discretionary domestic spending over that decade of 6.5 percent to 5.1 percent
or 6.4 percent to 4.5 percent of GDP. That implies a reduction in the resources
available to agencies to perform their missions of 21 percent to 29 percent over
the next decade.
In short, the country cannot sustain its present combination of agency
missions, agency resources, and judicially mandated agency decision-making
procedures. The options to create a sustainable government include a large
increase in taxes, a large reduction in agency missions, a large reduction in the
cost of judiciallymandated procedures or some combination of the three. That
choice should be easy to make, particularly given the adverse effects of the
judicially mandated procedures for rulemaking on the quality of the resulting
rules. Reducing the cost of judicially mandated procedures would at least
reduce the magnitude of the tax increases and reductions in agency missions
that will be needed to maintain a sound fiscal policy in an environment in
which increases in entitlement spending account for a constantly increasing
share of tax revenue.
iv judicially mandated rulemaking procedures
increase bias in outcomes
The high cost of judicially mandated rulemaking procedures might be worth
paying if there was reason to believe that those procedures produce improved
outcomes. There is no evidence to support that belief. Instead, studies have
found that the notice-and-comment process, as it has been interpreted and
applied by courts, contains many sources of systemic bias in favor of regulated
firms.
The first robust finding of the studies is that the most important part of
the decision-making process takes place before the agency issues its notice
of proposed rulemaking.81 The pre-notice part of the decision-making pro-
cess takes about twice as long as the post-notice part of the decision-making
80 Congressional Budget Office, The Economic Outlook for 2015 to 2024 (2015). See
alsoWilliamGalston, A Budget Hemmed in By Reality,Wall Street Journal, Feb. 4, 2015, at A13;
Richard Pierce, The Battle to Protect the American Public Will Become Even More Difficult,
79 G.W. L. Rev. 845 (2011) (book review); Richard Pierce, Judicial Review of Agency Actions
in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 Admin. L. Rev. 61 (1996).
81 Kimberly Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plumber”: The Sausage-Making of Financial Reform,
55 Ariz. L. Rev. 53, 70–71 (2013); Wagner et al., supra note 49, at 110–13.
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process.82 The agency’s goal in the pre-notice part of the decision-making
process is to render the post-notice process of receiving and considering com-
ments irrelevant by publishing a proposed rule that is virtually identical to the
final rule. The pre-notice decision-making process consists primarily of a large
number of private meetings with individuals and firms that have an interest in
the outcome of the process. Thus, for instance, agency decision-makers had
450 meetings with interested parties before they published the notice in the
proceeding to issue the Volcker Rule – the rule that arguably was the most
important one issued to implement the Dodd–Frank Act.83 Similarly, EPA
decision-makers had an average of 178 meetings with interested parties before
EPA published the notices that led to the issuance of each of 90 air toxic
emission standards.84
The pre-notice meetings are dominated by regulated parties and the
law firms and trade associations that represent them. Thus, for instance,
93.1 percent of the pre-notice meetings with decision-makers in the Volcker
rulemaking were with financial institutions or their representatives while par-
ties with interests in strict regulation of financial organizations accounted for
only 6.9 percent% of those meetings.85 The disproportion was even greater in
the ninety EPA rulemakings. On average, regulated firms had 170 times more
meetings with agency decision makers than did representatives of potential
beneficiaries of the rules.86 In over half of the EPA rulemakings, only reg-
ulated firms and their representatives met with decision makers before EPA
issued its notice.87 Not surprisingly, the studies produce a robust finding that
regulated firms have far greater influence over the substance of a proposed
rule than do potential beneficiaries of the rule.88
The bias in favor of regulated firms continues in the post-notice period.
In many rulemakings, the largest number of comments by far come from
individuals who prefer strict regulation.89 Virtually all of those comments
are worthless to decision-makers, however. They consist of little more than
slogans that are more appropriate as bumper stickers than as contributions to a
decision-making process – e.g., “protect us from being poisoned by polluters”
or “protect us from thieving bankers.”90
82 Wagner et al., supra note 49, at 144–45. 83 Krawiec, supra note 81, at 70–71, 78–84.
84 Wagner et al., supra note 49, at 124. 85 Krawiec, supra note 81, at 79–80.
86 Wagner et al., supra note 49, at 125. 87 Id. at 125.
88 Krawiec, supra note 81, at 82; Wagner et al., supra note 49, at 124–28.
89 Krawiec, supra note 81, at 71–78.
90 Id. at 71–78; Cynthia Farina, Mary Newhart & Josiah Heidt, Rulemaking vs. Democracy:
Judging and Nudging Public Participation that Counts, 2 Mich. J. Envtl. & Admin. L. 123,
139–44 (2012).
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By contrast, the comments submitted by, or on behalf of, regulated firms
are long, well-crafted, and rich in data and analysis.91 Regulated firms and
their representatives submit the vast majority of the kinds of comments that
have the potential to persuade decision-makers and to which courts require
an adequate response in a statement of basis and purpose. They accounted
for an average of 81 percent of all of the detailed comments submitted in the
90 rulemakings in which EPA issued air toxic emission standards.92 Parties
who favored more strict air quality rules did not submit any comments in a
majority of those rulemakings, and they accounted for an average of only 4
percent of all comments.93 Not surprisingly, 83 percent of changes that EPA
made in response to comments weakened the proposed rule.94 Once we have
a clear picture of the nature and magnitude of the systemic bias in favor of
regulated firms in the notice-and-comment rulemaking process it is relatively
easy to identify the major sources of the bias. They include: collective action
problems; judicial decisions that define an adequate notice and an adequate
statement of basis and purpose; and judicial decisions that determine who has
standing to obtain judicial review of rules.
A Collective Action Problems
MancurOlson identified themost important source of bias in favor of regulated
firms half a century ago.95 When a public policy debate pits a large number
of people, each with a small amount at stake, against a small number of
people, each with a large amount at stake, the small number of people have
a major advantage in the decision-making process. Consider, for instance, a
decision whether to issue an air quality rule that would provide $3 billion
worth of benefits to a population of 300 million and that would impose costs
of $1 billion on ten regulated firms. Any economically rational decision-maker
who has an accurate and complete understanding of the stakes would decide
to issue the rule. The decision-maker is unlikely to obtain an accurate and
complete understanding of the stakes, however, through the combination of
meetings and comments that are the primary means through which agency
decision-makers are educated in the rulemaking process.
Each of the 300 million potential beneficiaries of the rule has $10 at stake. It
would make no sense for any member of that group to spend more than $10 to
91 Krawiec, supra note 81, at 74–78; Wagner et al., supra note 49, at 128–32.
92 Wagner et al., supra note 49, at 128–29. 93 Id. at 128–29. 94 Id. at 130–31.
95 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory
of Groups (1965). See also Wagner et al., supra note 49, at 128.
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learn about the issues in the debate and to attempt to influence the outcome
of the debate. The issues in most such debates are complicated. Each of the
300million beneficiaries is likely to remain rationally ignorant of the issues and
impotent as a potential source of influence on decision-makers. Moreover, the
transactions costs involved in any potential effort to form a group of potential
individual beneficiaries that cooperate in an attempt to understand the issues
and to influence the outcome of the debate are so high that beneficiary groups
do not have sufficient resources to file effective comments in most major
rulemakings.
Each of the ten firms that would bear the costs of the rule has $100 million
at stake. Each can rationally spend up to $100 million to learn about the issues
in the debate and to influence the outcome of the debate. An expenditure of
even 10 percent of that amount is sufficient to hire the combination of talented
lawyers and consultants required to participate effectively in meetings with
decision-makers and to draft the kinds of detailed comments that are rich in
data and analysis that are likely to be effective in persuading decision-makers
not to issue the rule. Moreover, the benefits of engaging in a cooperative effort
to persuade the agency not to issue the rule vastly exceed the transactions
costs of organizing such an effort. Thus, each firm is likely to participate
effectively in the decision-making process both individually and through a
trade association.
B Judicial Decisions Defining Notice and Statement of Basis and Purpose
Courts have adopted two definitions of the “notice” an agency must issue as
the first formal step in the rulemaking process. First, the notice must “ade-
quately foreshadow” the final rule.96 Any significant difference between the
rule proposed in the notice and the final rule increases the risk that a court
will hold that the rule is invalid because the notice was inadequate. Second,
the agency must identify in the notice any source of data or analysis that it will
rely on in the statement of the basis and purpose the agency must incorporate
in its final rule.97
Thefirst requirement gives agencies a powerful incentive to resolve allmajor
issues in a rulemaking before it issues its notice, while the second provides a
powerful incentive to minimize the time between the issuance of the notice
96 Wagner Electric Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1972). See generally Pierce, supra note
37, at § 7.3.
97 Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (1973). See generally Pierce, supra note
37, at § 7.3.
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and the issuance of the final rule. Taken together, they explain why the studies
of the rulemaking process find that the pre-notice part of the process is twice
as long as the post-notice part of the process and why, in the words of one
of the researchers, the rule must be “essentially in final form at the proposed
rule stage” in order to survive judicial review.98 Of course, those findings are
consistent with the finding that the pre-notice part of the decision-making
process is more important than the post-notice part of the decision-making
process and that the bias in favor of regulated firms is particularly powerful in
the pre-notice part of the decision-making process.
Courts have held that the statement of basis and purpose that must be
incorporated in a final rule must respond adequately to all well-supported
comments that are critical of a proposed rule in order to avoid judicial rejection
of the rule as arbitrary and capricious.99 That requirement gives regulated firms
and their representatives a powerful incentive to submit the kinds of detailed
comments that are rich in data and analysis that they routinely submit. It
provides a powerful incentive for agencies to make changes to proposed rules
that are favored by regulated firms to avoid the risk of judicial rejection of
the final rule based on a conclusion that the agency’s response to the well-
supported comments was inadequate. It also provides a powerful incentive for
agencies to avoid having to make such changes or to explain why they have
not done so by proposing in the notice a rule that already incorporates the
features that are favored by regulated firms. In short, these judicial decisions
go a long distance in explaining both why the post-notice decision making
process is biased in favor of regulated firms and why the pre-notice decision
making process is biased in favor of regulated firms.
C Judicial Decisions on Standing
A petitioner has standing to obtain judicial review of a rule if, but only if, it
can establish that it has suffered a judicially cognizable injury that was caused
by the agency action and that can be redressed by a court.100 Any regulated
firm can establish easily that it has standing to obtain review of any rule that
imposes costs on the firm, but courts often hold that an individual who is likely
to benefit from issuance of a rule does not have standing to obtain review of a
98 Wagner et al., supra note 49, at 110.
99 National Tire Dealers and Retreaders Ass’n v. Brinegar, 491 F2d. 31, 40–41 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See generally Pierce, supra note 37, at § 7.4.
100 Ass’n of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 US 150, 152–5 (1970). The
extremely complicated law that governs standing to obtain judicial review of an agency action
is discussed in Pierce, supra note 37, at chapter 16.
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decision not to issue a rule that would have the potential to confer benefits on
the individual. Thus, for instance, theD.C.Circuit issued an opinion in which
it held that any regulated entity has standing to obtain review of any agency
action101 on the same day that it held that none of the six bases for standing
claimed by beneficiaries of an agency was sufficient to support standing.102
The Supreme Court has refused to recognize injuries to potential bene-
ficiaries of agency actions as sufficient to support standing because they are
“shared with millions of others;”103 they are not “imminent;”104 or, they are
future injuries that are not “certainly impending.”105 It is also more difficult for
potential beneficiaries to establish that the action they seek to have reviewed
caused their injury106 or is redressable by a court.107 This asymmetric access
to judicial review gives agencies an incentive to consider more seriously the
views expressed by the firms who are regulated by a rule and who can take
them to court than the views of the individuals who benefit from the issuance
of a rule but who often lack the power to take the agency to court.
v the eu uses nineteenth-century procedures successfully
in the twenty-first century
The European Union (EU) has an executive branch, the European Commis-
sion, and a legislative branch, the European Parliament. The Commission
uses a decision-making procedure roughly analogous to the US notice-and-
comment process to create proposed legislation: “[A]ll proposals considered
by the Council and the Parliament for actions that will have the force of
law on Member States and all of their citizens . . . must originate with the
Commission.”108
The Commission’s procedure for creating a legislative proposal begins with
publication of a “work plan” that is roughly analogous to a US agency’s notice
101 National Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 786 F.3d 34, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
102 Turlock Irrigation District v. FERC, 786 F.3d 18, 23–25 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
103 United States v. Richardson, 418 US 166, 176–77 (1974).
104 Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 US 488, 495–96 (2009).
105 Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1147–48 (2013).
106 E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 US 737, 756–57 (1984) (injury is not “fairly traceable” to the chal-
lenged government action because “the line of causation & is attenuated” and is dependent
on the action of some third party.”).
107 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 US 83, 106–07 (1998) (civil penalties cannot
redress an injury to individuals).
108 Comparative Law and Regulation: Understanding the Global Regulatory Pro-
cess (Francesca Bignami & David Zaring eds., 2016); Peter Strauss, Rulemaking in the Ages
of Globalization and Information: What America Can Learn from Europe and Vice Versa, 12
Colum. J. Eur. L. 645, 651 (2006).
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of proposed rulemaking.109 The Commission then engages in “consultation.”
Consultation is roughly analogous to solicitation of comments in the U.S.110 It
differs, however, in both its rigor and its results: “[C]ommission consultations
tend to be quite structured in character, requiring responses to a series of
questions about identity and interest and then asking particular questions
about the matter under study.”111
The comments elicited through this highly structured process differ from
those received by a US agency in a major rulemaking. Professor Strauss’s
description of the results of one Commission consultation with respect to a
major legislative proposal illustrates the differences. There were:
968 participants in an Interactive Policymaking tool that was, in part, a
structured questionnaire, and a total of 6400 comments of varying length
and detail . . . in contradistinction to the American rulemaking processes of
equivalent controversiality, virtually all of these comments appear to have
spoken to the proposals in knowledgeable detail.112
As Professor Strauss noted, the contrast with the US notice-and-comment
process is stark. The vast majority of the comments filed in a typical major
US rulemaking are worthless to decision-makers because they consist of brief
assertions with no supporting data or analysis.113
The process of creating a legislative proposal in the EU also includes an
assessment of the expected impact of the proposal. This step is roughly equiv-
alent to the cost–benefit analysis (cba) that the Office of Information and Reg-
ulatory Affairs (OIRA) implements with respect to major rules proposed by US
agencies, though it differs in some important respects from its US analogue.
Thus, for instance, it is broader in scope than a cba; it includes assessment
of the likely environmental impact of the proposal. It is also accomplished
through use of a far more publicly visible procedure than the largely opaque
OIRA review process.114
The biggest differences between the US and EU decision-making proce-
dures are apparent in the explanations of the rules that emerge from the
process. The typical explanation of an EU rule is about eight pages long, com-
pared with the 200- to 2000-page statement of basis and purpose that usually
accompanies a major rule issued by a US agency.115 That difference undoubt-
edly is attributable to the differing roles that the judiciary play in the US and
the EU.US courts invariably review all major rules through use of an approach
109 Strauss, supra note 108, at 656–60. 110 Id. at 664–70. 111 Id. at 668.
112 Id. at 669–70. 113 E.g., Krawiec, supra note 81, at 71–78.
114 Strauss, supra note 108, at 660–64. 115 Id. at 675.
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that requires an agency to write an extremely lengthy and detailed statement
of the basis and purpose of the rule to have any chance of persuading a US
court to uphold a major rule. Courts play no role in the decision-making
process in the EU. The architects of the EU decision-making process acted
on the belief that “[s]uch an over-legalistic approach would be incompatible
with the need for timely delivery of policy, and with the expectations of the
citizens that the European Institutions should deliver on substance rather than
concentrating on procedures.”116
vi how can we move back to the future?
In theory, Congress can move us back to a time in which agencies could
function efficiently and effectively without an army of lawyers. Congress could
amend the APA in ways that reduce significantly the role of courts. There
are two problems with this potential solution, however. First, it is unlikely
to happen. It has always been difficult to get the House, the Senate, and
the President to agree on an amendment to the APA, and that difficulty
has increased significantly in recent years as a result of increased political
polarity.117 Second, changes in the language of the APA might not be effective
in any event, given the potential for the courts to distort the APA to suit
their preferences, as illustrated by the judicial interpretations of “notice” and
“concise general statement of basis and purpose.”118
Since the excessive proceduralization of the rulemaking process was caused
primarily by judicial decisions that adopted interpretations of the APA that bear
no relationship to the language of the statute, courts can, and should, eliminate
the problems they have created by adopting interpretations of the APA that are
based on the language of the APA. Thus, for instance, the “concise general
statement of basis and purpose” required by APA section 553 cannot possibly
refer to a judicially required statement that must be hundreds or thousands of
pages long and that still has a 30 percent probability of being determined to
be inadequate by a court.119
116 Id. at 665.
117 Thomas Mann & Norman Ornstein, It’s Even Worse Than It Looks: How the
American Constitutional System Collided With the New Politics of Extremism
(2013).
118 See supra text accompanying notes 21–55.
119 See supra text accompanying notes 15–17. Jacob Gersen and Adrian Vermeule have made a
strong case for a significant reduction in the intensity with which courts apply the arbitrary
and capricious test to rulemakings in Thin Rationality Review, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 1355
(2016).
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The courts could go farther by eliminating the dubious presumption of
reviewability of agency action,120 or at least the unsupportable presumption of
pre-enforcement review, as a majority of Justices once suggested.121 The courts
could expand the scope of APA section 701(a)(2) – the exemption from judicial
review applicable to “agency action that is committed to agency discretion by
law”122 – by adopting an interpretation that is consistent with the famous
dictum in Marbury v. Madison: “The province of the courts is solely to decide
on the right of individuals, not to enquire how the executive or executive
officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.”123
Consistent with that famous precedent and many others, the courts could
interpret the Case or Controversy requirement of Article III to prohibit courts
from engaging in pre-enforcement review of agency rules.124
conclusion
There are two primary differences between nineteenth-century agencies and
modern agencies. First, nineteenth-century agencies were more efficient and
effective than modern agencies as measured by the number of rules issued
and the effects of the rules issued. Second, while actions taken by modern
agencies are subject to judicial review, actions taken by nineteenth-century
agencies were not. The two differences are closely linked. During the period
1967 to 1974, courts issued decisions that require agencies to use inefficient
procedures that consume enormous quantities of agency resources and create
years of delay in the process of issuing, amending, or rescinding a major rule.
The high cost of those judicially mandated procedures might be acceptable
if they improved significantly the results of the rulemaking process and if we
could afford to continue to absorb those costs. Neither of those conditions
exist.
There is no evidence that the judicially mandated procedures improve the
quality of the resulting rules. To the contrary, there is considerable evidence
that they introduce powerful systemic bias in the rulemaking process. We
also cannot continue to absorb the high costs of the judicially mandated
procedures. They are already creating intolerable delay in the agency decision-
making process, and the significant reductions in the resources available to
agencies that are inevitably consistent with fiscal policy constraints will render
them far less affordable in the future.
120 Bagley, supra note 18. 121 Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long-TermCare, 529US 1 (2000).
122 5 USC §701 (a)(2). 123 5 US 137, 170 (1803).
124 Mashaw & Harfst, Auto Safety, supra note 2, at 157.
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The courts can solve this problem by overruling their decisions of the
late 1960s and early 1970s that adopted interpretations of the APA and the
Constitution that conferred on courts far more power over agency decision-
making than the language of either document can support. By correcting
their prior errors, the courts can restore the traditional legal regime in which
agencies could perform their functions efficiently and effectively.
